

Draft No-First-Use Strategy

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Goals:

(1) To achieve commitments by all nuclear weapons states, in particular the US and Russia, that they will not use or threaten nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapons state that is a signer of the NPT, and will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

(2) To assure these commitments go beyond declaratory policy to concrete implementation--led by the US and Russia--through steps that reduce or eliminate first-use and first-strike capability and readiness, thus embodying a no-first-use posture.

Such steps could include:

(a) withdrawing all tactical nuclear weapons from operational units;

(b) placing the weapons withdrawn in storage under bilateral or international monitoring;

(c) eliminating tactical nuclear weapons: dismantling warheads and placing the fissile material under international safeguards;

(d) moving progressively toward a "zero-alert" posture, with warheads removed from delivery vehicles, and international monitoring of non-alert status.

(e) changing training, manuals, exercises and operations--as well as force deployment and posture--in observable ways to reflect no-first-use doctrine.

(3) Given no-first-use commitments by all nuclear-weapons states and movement toward no-first-use posture:

(a) the UN Security Council should prohibit first use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and decide to take effective action--to include broad economic sanctions and possible military action--against any state violating such prohibitions, and in support of any non-nuclear state subject to nuclear threats or attacks;

(b) the permanent members of the UN Security Council should declare jointly their determination to act promptly and effectively to enforce the above undertakings.

Strategy:

(1) November-December 1993: Persuade the Administration to adopt a simplified and strengthened, unconditional Negative Security Assurance (the first part of goal 1 above):

The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapons state which is a signer of the NPT.

Russia should then be pressed, in advance of or at the Summit meeting between Clinton and Yeltsin in January, to make this a joint US-Russian commitment. It could be announced at the Summit (or earlier).

(Subsequently, Great Britain and France should be pressed to join the US, Russia and China in this assurance.)

The US declaration would immediately help in negotiations with North Korea over its observance of its obligations under the NPT. The Russian declaration would help induce Ukraine to observe its earlier promise to enter the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapons state.

(2) November-December, 1993: Suggest to Administration officials that Clinton could ask Yeltsin at the January Summit (or before) for a reaffirmation of all the Gorbachev-Yeltsin undertakings about tactical nuclear weapons--with respect to withdrawal from deployment and (in part) dismantlement--and for confirmation of actual withdrawal and dismantlement, offering reciprocal confirmation of US implementation.

(3) November, 1993-spring, 1994: Persuade the Administration to adopt goals 1-3 above as USG policy, in part by interacting with officials working on (a) the Nuclear Doctrine Review and (b) the reports to Congress on no-first-use and on the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons required by the recent House-Senate Conference on the Defense Authorization Bill.

In support of these efforts, we need position papers making the case for no-first-use policy, and particularly explaining its importance to ending proliferation and the concrete ways in which it can be implemented in plans, operations, deployment, technology, development, force size and posture, alerts, readiness, manuals, training and exercises.